Meeting with Bud McFarlane

6 September 1984

Please return to SA/DCI/IA

5 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Bud McFarlane, 6 September 1984

1. You are scheduled to meet with Bud McFarlane, Thursday evening, 5 p.m., in his office. The NSC did not have any items for Thursday's agenda. MR. McFARLANE WILL ONLY BE AVAILABLE FOR 20 MINUTES DUE TO ANOTHER APPOINTMENT.

- 2. For our part, if you decide to keep this appointment, you may wish to raise the following issues:
 - Salvador/Nicaragua Update: At Tab A is an update on the situation in El Salvador and in Nicaragua. Of note is the apparent Salvadoran insurgents' willingness to postpone the offensive in favor of direct negotiations with Duarte; Duarte's unwillingness to engage now in such negotiations; the ongoing loading of a Bulgarian ship that may be used to transport L-39s to Nicaragua; and, finally, evidence of a growing Cuban role in Nicaragua.
 - Leaks: At Tab B you will find talking points which will allow you to update the National Security Advisor on the status of the investigation on the publication of satellite imagery in "Jane's." Apparently it was Jane's U.S. office that forwarded three satellite photos and accompanying text to Jane's UK office. Jane's UK office claims that they thought it was an "official leak" and so went ahead and published. At this point, they apparently retain the satellite imagery prints in a safe in the office of Jane's editor-in-chief.
 - The Soviet Leadership: At Tab C you will find talking points that allow you to initiate a general discussion on the prospects for the Soviet leadership. Chernenko's appearance yesterday on television would seem to indicate that rumors of his having had a heart attack in August were incorrect and perhaps purposely spread. There is some possibility that an extended battle for the successor's mantle is already under way--one that involves Gorbachev and Romanov--and rumors concerning Chernenko's health are a reflection of that struggle. Neither Gorbachev nor Romanov, however, are likely to have sufficient backing for a near-term, clear-cut victory. Thus, we can expect more rumors about Chernenko's imminent demise and more muddling through in the policy domain.

3. If I can do more to help in preparing for this meeting, please

call.

25X1

25X1

NIO/LA 5 September 1984

DCI TALKING POINTS

EL SALVADOR UPDATE

There are continuing indications that the Salvadoran insurgents are reluctant to begin their planned fall offensive and would like instead to begin negotiations with President Duarte.

-- The insurgents have been sending signals of their willingness to talk through a variety of intermediaries recently, including Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Catholic Church.

messages indicated that if Duarte expressed a desire to negotiate by the first week of September, the Fall general offensive would be further postponed.

-- Duarte has refused to respond positively

because he believes time is on his side and does
not want to alienate his own military.

Meanwhile, the Salvadoran Army has begun a new series of offensive sweeps by its five immediate reaction battalions after a period of rest and recuperation.

- -- Duarte also has allowed a rightist officer involved in a previous case of insubordination, Col. Ochoa, to assume a key field command in the north because of his proven combat record.
- -- The Army hopes to keep the insurgents off balance and prevent major resupply efforts from Nicaragua.
- -- Although the Army has been generally successful, reports indicate that guerrilla supplies continue to trickle in by land, air, and sea, in some cases via Mexico and Guatemala.

SECRET		
--------	--	--

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 25X1

25X1

NICARAGUA UPDATE

The L-39 jet aircraft sent from Libya to Bulgaria may soon be shipped to Nicaragua.

- -- A Bulgarian ship which has previously transported arms to Nicaragua apparently is currently loading military cargo, including radar equipment and armored vehicles, at the Bulgarian port of Burgas, where the L-39's are located.
- -- If the ship loads the L-39's and departs shortly, it could arrive at El Bluff, Nicaragua, by late September.
- -- Meanwhile, a Sandinista Army spokesman announced on 30 August that the arrival of modern combat aircraft in Nicaragua is near.
- -- He also reffirmed that the major airbase at Punta Huete, which should have its main runway paved by late September, is being built for the new aircraft.

			L-39's				air-	to-air	miss	iles	
will	pose	a sig	gnifica	nt thi							
					to	insur	~gent	resupp	ly f	lights	•

There are increasing signs that the Cuban military presence in Nicraragua may be on the rise, and that the Cubans are playing a key role in the counterinsurgency effort.

Officers are preparing to deploy to Nicaragua in late September.

killed in the recent raid on a military camp in northern Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista forces.

-- A Cuban pilot was killed in late August in northern Nicaragua when his MI-8 helicopter crashed, probably during a combat mission in support of the Sandinista Army.

a Cuban is training five companies of Sandinista soldiers at a large training camp in northern Nicaragua, and another Cuban claims to be a company commander at a base in the northwest.

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2009/09/14: CIA-RDP86B00420R000400780001-2

TOP SECRET

Notes on Jane's Defence Weekly Publication of Classified Imagery

3 August 1984 - <u>Washington Post, Wash</u> Satellite photos, noting they were fr August 1984.	ington Times and others published om Jane's Defence Weekly issue d	d ated 11
The FBI and the Navy, in a joint suspect. He is a civilian employee of disclosed classified information in the being processed through a Navy laboration further evidence, the Justice Departmental order.	he past. Evidence from his offi- tory. If laboratory testing pro-	ave ce is vides
suspect. He is a civilian employee of disclosed classified information in to being processed through a Navy labora further evidence, the Justice Departmentage order.	f the Navy, who is believed to he past. Evidence from his offictory. If laboratory testing propert will be asked to seek a Title to which disclosures of classiff position have become commonplatificial disclosures of classifies between unattributed official The recipients of this leaked in thich. Regardless of motive, the	ave ce is vides e III ied ce. d
suspect. He is a civilian employee of disclosed classified information in the desired processed through a Navy laboral further evidence, the Justice Departmentage order. This leak illustrates the extension formation to support a controversion of the coordinating of the coordinating of the coordination and no way to distinguish disclosures and unauthorized leaks.	f the Navy, who is believed to he past. Evidence from his offictory. If laboratory testing propert will be asked to seek a Title to which disclosures of classiff position have become commonplatificial disclosures of classifies between unattributed official The recipients of this leaked in thich. Regardless of motive, the	ave ce is vides e III ied ce. d
uspect. He is a civilian employee of isclosed classified information in the eing processed through a Navy laboral urther evidence, the Justice Departmentage order. This leak illustrates the extension formation to support a controversion here is no system for coordinating of the eight of th	f the Navy, who is believed to he past. Evidence from his offictory. If laboratory testing propert will be asked to seek a Title to which disclosures of classiff position have become commonplatificial disclosures of classifies between unattributed official The recipients of this leaked in thich. Regardless of motive, the	ave ce is vides e III ied ce. d

Approved For Release 2009/09/14 : CIA-RDP86B00420R000400780001-2

Approved For Release 2009/09/14 : CIA-RDP86B00420R000400780001-2

SECRET

PROPOSED DCI TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP SCENE

Chernenko's appearance on live TV suggests he is not likely to die in the immediate future.

He is clearly in poor physical shape. Although we have several reports he suffered a heart attack in early August, his current appearance tends to argue against this.

The political battle for the succession is certainly heating up, however.

August saw a major rumor campaign about Chernenko's imminent demise. Given its control of contacts with foreigners, the KGB was probably the major institution behind this.

At the same time a labored effort was made by Chernenko partisans in the central apparatus to keep his name in the public eye and they probably contrived the cosmonaut ceremony to help quell rumors about his health.

Gorbachev's standing as the "heir apparent" is more pronounced than ever before in Soviet history. But his accession to the General Secretaryship will not be automatic, far less his consolidation of the power needed to lead and address Soviet problems over the longer run.

On the contrary a major and probably protracted personal and factional battle for power appears to be underway. It is likely to persist for some time even if Gorbachev becomes General Secretary in the next several months.

For now it looks like Gorbachev versus Romanov.

Gorbachev has several advantages.

Good politician and manager, probably looked to as one who can reform aspects of management while preserving central control.

Strong influence over party appointments now.

The candidate of the "Andropov faction", with probable backing of the KGB.

Romanov looks like he was brought into the Secretariat in June 1983 by Chernenko's allies in the central and regional apparatus to counterbalance Gorbachev.

From the Secretariat he supervises defense industry -- and may therefore have ties to Ustinov -- and also the KGB and regular police -- and may in this role keep them from helping Gorbachev the way they helped Andropov.

SECRET

The contours of the present infighting cannot be described with confidence. We can say with more confidence that the outlook favors a hard and probably protracted contest, with darkhorses perhaps appearing in the months and years ahead.

This is because the present front runners now lack the firm political bases to assure them the General Secretary's post once Chernenko dies or to consolidate power once they get the job.

There is a perceptible difference between Gorbachev's and Romanov's rhetorical records on policy toward the US.

Gorbachev has signaled an inclination toward slightly more flexible policies.

Romanov's record is uniformly hardline.

These differences are probably not germane to real policy choice.

During the struggle for power, all contenders are likely to take refuge in hardline postures, while trying to fault the competition with deviations of some kind.

Once in power, any of the candidates is likely to experiment with more flexible policies than we have recently seen.

But none have so far given signs of willingness to sacrifice Soviet foreign and military amibitions.